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Abstract
When the government must decide not only on broad public-policy programs but also on
the provision of group-speciﬁc public goods, dynamic strategic ineﬃciencies arise. The struggle
between opposing groups–that disagree on the composition of expenditures and compete for
oﬃce–results in governments being endogenously short-sighted: systematic under-investment in
infrastructure and overspending on public goods arises, as resources are more valuable when
in power. This distorts allocations even under lump-sum taxation. Ideological biases create
asymmetries in the group’s relative political power generating endogenous economic cycles in
an otherwise deterministic environment. Volatility is non-monotonic in the size of the bias and
is an additional source of ineﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
Public policy and institutions are found to be relevant factors in explaining the large diﬀerences in
income per-capita across countries.1 However, policies that enhance growth and promote develop-
ment are not always chosen by the government (especially in under-developed economies). Why?
A group of explanations attributes it to the instability that results from major political upheaval
and coups d’etat.2 It turns out that even democratic countries, where changes in government follow
a stable election process, exhibit large disparities in income and implemented policies. Several au-
thors suggest that this could be the result of failures or frictions in the decision-making process of
the public sector.3 A basic point is that policymakers can engage in rent-seeking activities and may
choose ineﬃcient policies in order to increase their probability of re-election so as to get continued
access to these oﬃce rents.4 However, one does not need to take such a cynical view of governments.
Even governments that are not “intrinsically bad” can, due to the democratic process itself—where
reelection is never certain—and the resulting natural lack of commitment, generate bad outcomes.
This is the idea pursued in the present paper.
I present a theoretical model where the struggle between groups with diﬀerent views that alter-
nate in power results in governments being endogenously short-sighted—at least more so than the
groups they represent. As a consequence, they tend to overspend and underinvest, reducing output
and private consumption. The party in power tries to tie the hands of its successor by strategically
manipulating public investment. Political uncertainty, together with the assumption of a funda-
mental lack of commitment, creates incentives to reduce the amount of public capital available for
the next policymaker as a way to restrict his level of spending. I show that the dynamic ineﬃciency
generated by the politician’s short-sightedness is mitigated by the degree of political stability. In
addition, asymmetries in the groups’ relative political power—which result from ideological biases
in the population—generate endogenous economic cycles. Macroeconomic variables ﬂuctuate in
equilibrium, even in the absence of productivity shocks. Analyzing the implications of this second
source of ineﬃciency will be the objective of this paper.
In this economy, the role of the government is to provide public goods and invest in productive
public capital, which are ﬁnanced through lump-sum taxation. There are two groups in the economy
that disagree over the composition of spending on public goods but not over its aggregate size or
over the level of infrastructure investment. Groups are represented by parties which alternate
in power via a democratic process, and election outcomes are uncertain. The degree of political
stability (i.e. frequency of turnover) is determined in a voting equilibrium. Agents are forward
looking and vote for the party that yields them higher expected utility. I consider a situation where
voter’s ideological biases towards one the groups yields its candidates a political advantage over
those from the other group, which leads to an asymmetric equilibrium. There is no commitment
technology, so promises made during the campaign are non-binding. I characterize time-consistent
outcomes as Markov-perfect equilibria. I ﬁrst derive the incumbent’s optimality condition for a
general case and characterize the determinants of political turnover in the equilibrium of a voting
model. Thus, the degree of political uncertainty is jointly determined with public policy, so it
depends on the primitives that shape it (i.e., on the intensity of ideology, on agent’s preferences,
and on technology). I then ﬁnd an analytical solution under speciﬁc functional assumptions in
1For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) study the relationship between property rights and diﬀerent
degrees of development.
2Barro (1996) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) provide evidence that coups reduce growth.
3See Persson and Tabellini (1999) for an excellent review of the literature.
4An analysis of the earlier models in this literature (e.g. Barro, Nordhaus, and Ferejohn) can be found in Drazen
(2000).
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order to derive testable implications from the theory. Finally, I present some empirical evidence
supporting the model predictions.
I ﬁnd that the group that has an advantage in the political dimension (i.e., its candidates
are more ‘popular’) wins the elections more often and spends a lower share of output on public
consumption, while investing a larger share than its counterpart. The political uncertainty is
propagated into the economy and endogenous economic cycles are generated, even though there is
no source of uncertainty other than the identity of the policymaker. This decreases welfare relative
to the ﬁrst best not only because it reinforces the dynamic ineﬃciency (investment is too low),
but also because it introduces volatility in macroeconomic variables (output, employment, and
consumption). Increases in the ideological bias widen the gap between the policies chosen by the
the two groups, as well as their probabilities of being elected. The size of business cycles induced
by changes in the bias is non-monotonic because it is aﬀected by changes in policy and probabilities
in opposite directions. As a result, economies where the political advantage is low exhibit rapid
turnover but small ﬂuctuations in policy as the gap in investment shares is small. At the other
extreme, when the biases are large so are the diﬀerences in policy, but the most popular party is
in power more often and hence ﬂuctuations are small. Volatility is largest for intermediate values
of the ideological bias. Using a proxy for investment shares and ideology biases for the US during
the period 1929-2006, I show that these two variables tend to comove, providing some support for
the theory.
On a more methodological level, this paper provides an optimality equation faced by the gov-
ernment in power that can be used to analyze the trade-oﬀs that arise in the presence of reelection
uncertainty. It reveals that there is a wedge between the marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt of in-
vestment when compared to the benevolent planner’s solution (so allocations are ineﬃcient). This
wedge arises from the existence of intertemporal strategic eﬀects. On the one hand, the government
wants to decrease the level of resources available to next period’s policymaker so as to restrict his
level of spending. But this will cause a negative eﬀect in the opposition’s investment level, which
the incumbent may want to boost if it expects the opposition to invest too little. On the other
hand, changes in policy may also modify reelection probabilities, which must be taken into account
by forward-looking governments.
Existing Literature
This paper contributes to a literature that analyzes the dynamic eﬃciency of policy choice in
representative democracies. It builds on the work by Besley and Coate (1998) and Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) who present the ﬁrst theories of political failure. In Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
parties choose to overspend in public goods and to create an excessive level of debt when the
outcome of elections is uncertain. In Besley and Coate (1998) parties fail to undertake a public
investment that is potentially Pareto improving due to lack of commitment in a two-period model.
Our work extends some of their insights to a dynamic inﬁnite-horizon political economy model,
particularly relevant for assessing the long-run eﬀects of current policy.
One of the papers most closely related to this is Amador (2008) who also analyzes the inef-
ﬁciencies generated by a common pool problem in a dynamic inﬁnite horizon model. His basic
mechanism, like the one in this paper, is based on the trade-oﬀs described in Alesina and Tabellini
(1990). Amador ﬁnds that politicians are too impatient behaving as hyperbolic consumers, which
results in ineﬃcient overspending and excessive deﬁcit creation. In his paper the alternation of
power is exogenous, while it is determined by voting in the current paper.5 Azzimonti (2010) endo-
genizes political turnover in a similar environment where the government distorts private investment
5Caballero and Yared (2008), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Devereux and Wen (1998) and Ilzetzki (2009) also
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in order to ﬁnance group speciﬁc public goods. Overspending results in equilibrium, but there is no
public investment. Battaglini and Coate (2007) introduce productive public goods ﬁnanced by the
government. Instead of focusing on political parties, they assume that policy is decided through
legislative bargaining. In their work the probability of being able to choose expenditures is exoge-
nous and only depends on the number of legislators, while it is endogenous here and depends on
the level of public investment. Additionally, distortions arise due to the assumption of proportional
taxation on labor income in their paper, while I assume those away by focusing on lump-sum taxes
(distortions arise because public capital aﬀects the productivity of labor here, while the two are
completely independent in their setup). 6 In addition, in these three papers parties are completely
symmetric so there are no ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables induced by changes of power.
The analysis of business cycles generated by ideological biases is a main contribution relative to
their work.
This paper also contributes the literature on ineﬃciencies resulting from the government’s lack of
commitment. While existing models with repeated voting ﬁnd strategic interactions, most of them
must rely on numerical methods to characterize the Markov-perfect equilibrium (i.e. Krusell and
Rios-Rull 1999). Hassler, Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004), on the other hand, ﬁnd analytical
solutions in an overlapping generations setup where policy is decided by majority voting, but assume
away political uncertainty. Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007) ﬁnd that expenditures in a
consumable public good can be ineﬃcient, but in a model where two-period lived agents vote over
redistributive policy. Unlike in their work, part of the expenditures are devoted to productive
investment, which allows us to analyze the eﬀects of policy on economic development.
I also extend existing work by endogenizing the probabilities of reelection in a dynamic setup.
A key assumption in this paper is that politicians are citizen candidates that do not have com-
mitment to platforms. As a result, voters expect the incumbent to maximize the utility of the
group he represents (disregarding the welfare of other groups). This is opposite to standard result
in probabilistic voting models with commitment to platforms, where the politicians maximization
problem is equivalent to that of a benevolent planner (see Sleet and Yeltekin, 2008 or Farhi and
Werning, 2008). In a recent paper Battaglini (2010) considers an environment where expected
ideological biases are persistent and candidates are oﬃce seekers with commitment to platforms.
He ﬁnds that the political equilibrium exhibits excessive debt creation and over spending. Due to
the assumption that there is no ex ante bias in favor or against any candidate, the equilibrium is
symmetric. Therefore, there are no ﬂuctuations in debt, taxes or macroeconomic variables gener-
ated by switches of power (other than those resulting from productivity shocks), which is the focus
of this study.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on ‘partisan cycles’. In contrast to previous
models in this literature (like Milesi-Ferreti and Spolaore, 1994, Persson and Svensson, 1989 or
more recently Song, 2009), I do not need to assume exogenous diﬀerences in preferences over the
size of public expenditures in order to generate ﬂuctuations. Parties have the same ex-ante utility
over the size of spending on public goods and on the level of investment. In equilibrium one
party may spend more and invest less just because it loses more often as a result of an ideological
disadvantage.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The model is described the Section 2 and the
Markov-perfect equilibrium deﬁned in Section 3. An analytical solution is presented in Section
analyze environments where exogenous political turnover introduces ineﬃciencies in debt accumulation and the level
of taxation in Markov-switching models. See Lagunoﬀ and Bai (2010) for an interesting case where the probabilities
are exogenous but depend on the aggregate state of the economy.
6Besley, Ilzetzki, and Persson (2010) study the eﬀects of exogenous political instability on ﬁscal capacity (a durable
public good) in a similar environment.
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4, where qualitative and quantitative implications are derived. Section 5 provides some empirical
support for the theory and Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 Economic environment
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy populated by agents that live in one of two regions, A and
B, of measure μJ = 12 , J = {A,B}. While they have identical income and identical preferences
over private consumption, they disagree on the composition of public expenditures since public
goods can be region-speciﬁc (e.g. parks, museums, environmental protection, public television,
etc). Agents also diﬀer in another dimension that is orthogonal to economic policy (religious views,
charisma of the politician, etc.). Preferences over this political dimension imply derived preferences
over candidates, and will take the form of additive iid preference shocks ξ (to be described in more
detail later). The instantaneous utility of agent j in region J at a particular point in time is
u(cj , nj) + v(gJ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
economic
+ ξj︸︷︷︸
political
, (1)
where u and v are increasing and concave in c and g, and u is decreasing in n, with v(0) ≡ v¯, cj
denotes the consumption of private goods, nj denotes labor, and gJ is the level of discretionary
spending on local goods in region J . Notice that an agent living in region A derives no utility from
the provision of a good in region B (and vice versa), so in principle there will be disagreement in
the population over the desired composition of public expenditures, but not on its size, since both
types have the same marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods.
There are inﬁnitely many competitive ﬁrms that produce a single consumption good and hire
labor each period so as to maximize proﬁts, which are distributed back to consumers who own shares
of these ﬁrms. Firms have access to a Cobb-Douglas technology: F (Kg, n) = AKθgn1−θ, where n is
the aggregate labor supply and Kg is the stock of public capital (i.e. infrastructure, public health,
and education, the knowledge produced by the public sector’s R&D and expenditures in national
defense or law enforcement). Its level is determined by government investments and acts as an
externality in production. The idea behind this speciﬁcation is that the better the infrastructure
(roads, harbors, sewers, etc.), the more educated the population and the stronger the protection of
property rights, the higher the productivity of the private sector.
The government raises revenues via lump-sum taxes τ which are chosen every period, so private
consumption is
cj = wnj + π − τ.
Taxes are used to ﬁnance the provision of consumable public goods (gA and gB) and investments
on productive public capital (IKg ). The cost of producing g > 0 units of a local public goods is
given by x(g), with x(0) = 0. Assuming that there is no debt, the government must balance its
budget every period, so its budget constraint reads as:∑
J
x(gJ ) + IKg = τ.
Assuming a depreciation rate of δ, public capital evolves according to:
K ′g = IKg + (1− δ)Kg,
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where primes denote next period variables. The assumption of lump-sum taxes is made in order
to highlight that ineﬃciencies in production may arise due to political frictions even when the
government has access to non-distortionary ﬁnancing instruments.
2.2 Planning solutions
Before describing the outcome under political competition (where diﬀerent parties alternate in
power), it is useful to characterize the optimal allocation chosen by a benevolent social planner.
The planner chooses {c,K ′g , gA, gB} so as to maximize a weighted sum of utilities, where the weight
on type J agents is λJ (with λA+λB = 1). All individuals within group J are treated in a symmetric
way since their political shocks are irrelevant for the determination of economic allocations. The
planner’s maximization problem follows.
V ∗(Kg) = max
∑
J
μJλJ [u(c, n) + v(gJ )] + βV ∗(K ′g),
subject to the resource constraint:∑
J
x(gJ) + c +K ′g = F (Kg, n) + (1− δ)Kg .
As long as the planner gives a positive weight to each agent, the optimal allocation of public
good J will be such that its marginal utility is proportional to the marginal utility of private
consumption.7
u1(c, n)xg(gJ) = ζJvg(gJ ), where ζJ =
λJ∑
J λ
J
< 1. (2)
By varying λJ between 0 and 1 it is possible to trace the Pareto frontier that characterizes the
optimal provision of public goods. Concavity of v implies that if type A agents have a higher weight
in the social welfare function, more of their desired public good will be provided (at the expense of
type B agents).
Labor satisﬁes a standard ﬁrst order condition where
u1(c, n)F2(Kg, n) + u2(c, n) = 0.
Finally, the planner chooses the level of public capital that equates the marginal costs in terms
of foregone consumption to the discounted marginal beneﬁts of the investment.
u1(c, n) = βu1(c′, n′)[F1(K ′g, n
′) + 1− δ]. (3)
The planner’s Euler equation is completely independent of the choice of the social welfare function:
changes in λJ do not aﬀect this margin. The results follows from assuming that both agents have
the same trade-oﬀ between private and public consumption (i.e. u and v are equal for all agents).
It is important to note that the planner is constrained to oﬀer all households the same con-
sumption allocation (that is, cA = cB). This is imposed in order to capture the constraint faced by
the government in the political equilibrium (where parties cannot tax agents at diﬀerent rates).8
7If the planner only cares about the well-being of, say, agent A, it will set gBt = 0∀t and gAt so as to equate the
marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods to the marginal cost of providing the goods xg(g).
8If we were to assume that λAμA = λBμB , the unconstrained social optima would coincide with the result
presented above).
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3 Political equilibrium
The role of the government in this economy is to provide public goods and productive public capital.
Given the disagreement between groups over which public good should be provided, political parties
will endogenously arise in a democratic environment. I analyze a stylized case where there are two
parties, A and B, representing each group in the population and competing for oﬃce every period.
There will be no distinction between a ‘candidate’ and a ‘party’ (all candidates have the same
preferences so there is no heterogeneity within a party).
The groups will alternate in power based on a political institution where “ideology” or other
non-economic issues play a role. In particular, I use a “probabilistic-voting” setup (see Lindbeck
and Weibull (1993)) in order to provide micro-foundations for political turnover: the probability of
being in power next period is going to be endogenously determined via an electoral process. A key
departure from the traditional probabilistic voting model is that parties do not have commitment
to platforms, so announcement made during the political campaign will not be credible unless they
are ex-post eﬃcient (that is, once the party takes power). The elected party decides on the level of
taxes and the allocation of government resources between spending and investment. Its objective
is to maximize the utility of its own type. 9
Timing
Each period will be divided into three stages: the Taxation Stage, the Production Stage and
the Election Stage.
At the Taxation Stage, the incumbent chooses τ, gA, gB and K ′g knowing the state of the economy
(Kg) and the distribution of political shocks but not their realized values. Hence, policy is chosen
under uncertainty. The probability of winning the election can be calculated by forecasting how
agents vote given diﬀerent realizations of the shock.
At the Production Stage agents choose labor supply and levels of consumption taking policy
as given, but under uncertainty about the identity of future policymakers. Firms hire labor and
distribute proﬁts, and the government implements the policy chosen by the party in power.
After production, consumption, and investment take place, ξ′ is realized. At the Election Stage,
agents vote for the party that gives them higher expected lifetime utility. They need to forecast
how the winner of the election chooses policy. The assumptions of rationality and perfect foresight
imply that agents’ predictions are correct in equilibrium.
3.1 Markov-perfect equilibrium
There is no commitment technology, so promises made by any party before elections are not credible
unless they are ex-post eﬃcient. The party in power plays a game against the opposition taking
their policy as given. Alternative realizations of history (deﬁned by the sequence of policies up
to time t) may result in diﬀerent current policies. In principle, this dynamic game allows for
multiple subgame-perfect equilibria that can be constructed using reputation mechanisms. I will
rule out such mechanisms and focus instead on Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), deﬁned as a
set of strategies that depend only on the current—payoﬀ relevant—state of the economy. Given
the sequence of events and the separability assumption between the economic and the political
dimensions, the only payoﬀ-relevant state variable is the stock of public capital. In a Markov-
perfect equilibrium, policy rules and voting decisions are functions of this state. Since there is no
9In that sense this is a partisan model, see Drazen (2000) or Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a description of
opportunistic party models.
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commitment and no retrospective voting, the values of gA and gB chosen by the incumbent are
irrelevant in the voting decision. So is the history of ideology shocks, since there is no persistence.
The equilibrium objects that we are interested in are policy functions, allocations, winning
probabilities, and value functions. There are three policy functions: the investment rule of incum-
bent i, hi(Kg), and expenditures in each region-speciﬁc good gAi (Kg) and g
B
i (Kg). Agent j’s labor
supply nij(Kg) and consumption cij(Kg) under incumbent i’s policies summarize the allocations
(ﬁrms decisions as well as aggregate consumption and labor supply can be trivially determined from
these functions). The probabilities will be denoted by pi(Kg). The value function—net of political
shocks—of agent j when his group is in power will be denoted by Vj(Kg) and when his group is out
of power by Wj(Kg). The characterization of the MPE follows, starting from the last stage (the
Election stage) to make the exposition clearer.
Election Stage
At this stage, agents must decide which party to vote for. The utility derived from political
factors, ξj, has two components: an individual ideology bias (denoted by ϕjJ) and an overall
popularity bias (ψ). In particular,
ξi =
(
ψ + ϕjJ
)
Ii,
where I is an indicator function such that IB = 1 and IA = 0, since the individual speciﬁc parameter
ϕjJ measures voter j ’s ideological bias towards the candidate from party B. I will follow Persson
and Tabellini (2000) by assuming that the distribution of ϕjJ is uniform and group-speciﬁc,
ϕjJ 
[
− 1
2φJ
,
1
2φJ
]
, with J = A,B.
These shocks are iid over time, hence ‘candidate speciﬁc.’ Each period, a given party presents a
candidate and voters form expectations about the candidate’s position on certain moral, ethnic
or religious issues, orthogonal to the provision of public goods. Examples are attitudes towards
crime (gun control or capital punishment), drugs (i.e. whether to legalize the use of marijuana),
immigration policies, pro-life or pro-choice positions, same sex marriage, etc. A value of zero
indicates neutrality in terms of the ideological bias, so agents only care about the economic policy,
while a positive value indicates that agent j prefers party B over A. Since ϕjJ can take positive
or negative values, there are members in each group that are biased towards both candidates.
Therefore, individuals belonging to the same group may vote diﬀerently.
The parameter ψ represents a general bias towards party B at each point in time. It measures
the average relative popularity of candidates from that party relative to those from party A. While
the realization of ϕjJ is individual-speciﬁc, the value of ψ is the same for all agents. 10 It captures
candidates’ personal characteristics such as honesty, leadership, integrity, charisma, trustworthiness,
etc. Candidates with higher values of ψ are preferable by all agents.
The popularity shock is iid over time and can also take positive or negative values. It is distributed
according to:
ψ 
[
−1
2
+ η,
1
2
+ η
]
.
A positive value for η (the expected value of ψ) implies that candidates from party B have an
average popularity advantage over those from the opposition. On the other hand, η = 0 implies
10Political scientists refer to this parameter as valence, referring to “issues on which parties or leaders are diﬀeren-
tiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in the public’s mind with conditions or
goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves”(Stokes, 1992).
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that parties are symmetric, in the sense that their candidates are expected to be equally popular
or charismatic.
Finally, agents are assumed to have perfect information about the candidates, so there are no
informational asymmetries in this model. At the election stage, voters compare their lifetime utility
under the alternative parties. The maximization problem of voter j in group A is given by
max
{
VA(K ′g) , WA(K
′
g) + ψ
′ + ϕjA′
}
,
where VA(K ′g) denotes the welfare of this agent if a candidate representing his group wins the
elections, while WA(K ′g) is the value of his utility if the candidate representing group B is elected.
The maximization problem of an agent in group B is analogously deﬁned.
Determination of probabilities
Let’s turn now to the intermediate stage between taxation and voting, where the shocks have
not yet been realized.
Individual j ∈ A votes for B whenever the shocks are such that
VA(K ′g) < WA(K
′
g) + ψ
′ + ϕjA′.
We can identify the swing voter in group A as the voter whose value of ϕjA′ makes him indiﬀerent
between the two parties
ϕA(K ′g) = VA(K
′
g)−WA(K ′g)− ψ′.
Figure 1 illustrates this point (assuming ψ = 0 for simplicity). The swing voter is found where the
two solid lines intersect. All voters in group A with ϕjA′ > ϕA(K ′g) also prefer party B as can be
seen in the graph.
The same type of analysis can be performed for agents in group B, to determine the swing voter
in that group. The value of ϕJ depends on the diﬀerence in utilities of having group A vs group B
being in oﬃce and on the realization of the popularity shock.
Given the assumptions about the distributions of ϕjA and ϕjB the share of votes for party B
is:
πB =
∑
J
μJP
(
ϕjJ ′ > ϕJ(K ′g)
)
=
1
2
−
∑
J
μJφJϕJ (K ′g).
Under majority voting, party B wins if it can obtain more than half of the electorate; that is, if
πB >
1
2 . This occurs whenever its relative popularity is high enough. There exists a threshold for
ψ, denoted by ψ∗(K ′g) such that B wins for any realization ψ > ψ∗(K ′g). After performing some
algebra using the expression above, we ﬁnd that
ψ∗(K ′g) =
1
φ
(
μAφA
[
VA(K ′g)−WA(K ′g)
]
+ μBφB
[
WB(K ′g)− VB(K ′g)
])
, (4)
where φ = μAφA + μBφB .
The threshold is given by a weighted sum of the diﬀerences in the utility of the swing voter
under each party. The weights depend on the dispersion in the ideology shocks and on the amount
of supporters that each party has. The higher the heterogeneity within a constituency (φJ ), the
bigger the eﬀect these factors have on the election outcomes. Also, the greater the number of
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individuals belonging to type J , the stronger the group in the determination of the probability.
Finally, note that the threshold depends on the level of public capital, though it is not clear in
which direction. In principle, this level could increase or decrease with K ′g.
Since ϕJ (K ′g) depends on the realized value of ψ, ex-ante the share of votes for party B (πB) is
a random variable. B’s probability of winning the election is given by:
pB(K ′g) = P
(
πB >
1
2
)
= P (ψ′ > ψ∗(K ′g)),
which is equivalent to:
pB(K ′g) =
1
2
+
[
η − ψ∗(K ′g)
]
. (5)
A’s probability of winning the next election is just pA(K ′g) = 1− pB(K ′g).
Recall that η represents the popularity advantage of candidates from party B over those from
party A. So in principle, B’s probability increases with η.
The current level of consumption in private and public capital does not aﬀect the voting decision
(i.e. no retrospective voting). Voters do not ‘punish’ politicians/parties for their past behavior but
decide instead in terms of future expected policy choices.
Production Stage
At this stage ﬁrms decide how much labor to hire given wages, and distribute proﬁts back
in the form of dividends to agents, who own shares of these ﬁrms. Agents choose consumption
and leisure, taking wages and government policy (public spending and investment) as given. A
competitive equilibrium given policy is deﬁned below, where we omit the stock of public capital Kg
from all functions to simplify the notation.
Deﬁnition 1: A competitive equilibrium given government policy Υ = {gA, gB ,K ′g} is a set of
allocations, {cj(Υ), nj(Υ),Π(Υ)}, prices w(Υ), and taxes τ(Υ) such that:
(i). Agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. Agent j’s labor supply satisﬁes
u1(cj(Υ), nj(Υ))w(Υ) + u2(cj(Υ), nj(Υ)) = 0,
where
cj(Υ) = w(Υ)nj(Υ) + Π(Υ)− τ(Υ).
(ii). Firms maximize proﬁts, so w(Υ) = F2(Kg, n(Υ)) and Π(Υ) = F (Kg, n(Υ))−w(Υ)n(Υ).
(iii). Markets clear n(Υ) =
∑
J μ
Jnj(KgΥ).
(iv). The government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
τ(Υ) =
∑
J
x(gJ ) + K ′g − (1− δ)Kg .
The static nature of ﬁrms’ and workers’ economic decisions simpliﬁes the characterization of
the competitive equilibrium to a great extent. Moreover, from condition (i) we can see that agents’
decisions are independent of their type j, which results from the additive separability of the political
shock. Hence, there is aggregation and we can think of the economic dimension as being character-
ized by the decisions of a representative agent with nj(Υ) = n(Υ) and cj(Υ) = c(Υ). Replacing the
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ﬁrm’s optimal decisions and the government budget constraint into the agent’s budget constraint
we obtain consumption as a function of policy,
c(Υ) = F (Kg, n(Υ)) + (1− δ)Kg −
∑
J
x(gJ )−K ′g, (6)
with labor as satisfying
u1(c(Υ), n(Υ))F2(Kg, n(Υ)) + u2(c(Υ), n(Υ)) = 0. (7)
The last two expressions allow us to write agent’s indirect utility, since they summarize the private
sector reaction to alternative policies.
Taxation Stage
At this stage, the incumbent must decide on the optimal policy knowing that he will be replaced
by a diﬀerent policymaker with some probability. Suppose that B is the elected party. Given the
stock of public capital Kg, his objective function today is:
max
gA,gB,K ′g≥0
u(c, n) + v(gB) + ξj + β{pB(K ′g)VB(K ′g) + pA(K ′g)WB(K ′g) + EB(ξ′j ;K ′g)} (8)
where consumption and labor satisfy equations (6) and (7), WB denotes the utility of a type
B agent when his party is out of power. EB(ξ′j ,K
′
g) represents the expected value of tomorrow’s
political shock conditional on B winning the next election (recall that this shock is a relative bias
towards a candidate form party B),
EB(ξ′j ;K
′
g) =
∫ 1
2
+η
ψ∗(K ′g)
z∂z,
which can be shown to be equal to
EB(ξ′j ;K
′
g) = pB(K
′
g)
[
1
2
pA(K ′g) + η
]
.
By changing the stock of public capital the incumbent aﬀects not only the economic dimension
but also his probability of winning and the expected value of political shocks. 11
Since gA and gB only aﬀect today’s utility, tomorrow’s decisions are independent of the com-
position of expenditures. If party i is in power, it will choose gJi = 0, for J = i, which further
simpliﬁes the problem. Slightly abusing notation, we use gi(Kg) to denote the equilibrium amount
spent by incumbent i on the local public good i. The description of the problem is completed by
deﬁning the functions VB(Kg) and WB(Kg):
VB(Kg) = u (cB(Kg), nB(Kg)) + v(gB(Kg))+ (9)
β{pB(hB(Kg))VB(hB(Kg)) + pA(hB(Kg))WB(hB(Kg)) + EB(ξ′j ;hB(Kg))}
and
WB(Kg) = u (cA(Kg), nA(Kg))+ (10)
11Other papers in the literature usually ignore political shocks because they study two period models, once the
shock has been realized. Since ξ is additive, focusing on net-of-shock welfare is without loss of generality. In this
paper, it would not be the case due to the fact that elections are held every period.
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β{pB(hA(Kg))VB(hA(Kg)) + pA(hA(Kg))WB(hA(Kg)) + EB(ξ′j ;hA(Kg))},
where Υi(Kg) = {gAi (Kg), gBi (Kg), hi(Kg)} denotes the equilibrium policy functions chosen by
incumbent type i, and where ci(Kg) = c(Υi(Kg)) and ni(Kg) = n(Υi(Kg)) are the competitive
equilibrium values of consumption and labor under the political equilibrium policies.
The choice of expenditures is a static one, aﬀecting only the intra-temporal margin. At the
optimum, the government chooses g so that the marginal cost of providing the good in terms of
consumption equals its marginal beneﬁt:
u1(cB(Kg), nB(Kg))xg(g) = vg(g). (11)
We can see that government spending in the MPE is sub-optimal from the standpoint of an utili-
tarian social planner by comparing eq. (2) to the equality above. This is the case for two reasons.
First, the group out of power gets no provision of their preferred good. Second, there is over-
spending in the sense that the marginal rate of private consumption is too low when compared to
that of the utilitarian optimum. Even the group in power would prefer a lower level of g if the
diﬀerence was invested in productive capital and subsequently used in the provision of its preferred
good instead.
The investment decision aﬀects the inter-temporal margin; the costs of increasing public capital
are paid today while the beneﬁts are received in the future. The government chooses K ′g so that
the marginal cost in terms of foregone consumption equals expected marginal beneﬁts:
u1(cB(Kg), nB(Kg)) = β{pB(K ′g)VB1(K ′g) + pA(K ′g)WB1(K ′g)
+pB1(K ′g)
[
VB(K ′g)−WB(K ′g)
]
+ EB2(ξ′j;K
′
g)},
where pB1(K ′g) =
∂pB(K
′
g)
∂K ′g
, and we use the fact that pA = 1− pB .
Even though parties represent their constituencies and have no derived value of being in oﬃce,
they will try to manipulate the probability of being re-elected (which allows them to implement
the desired policy in the future).
As in the planner’s ﬁrst-order condition, the cost of an extra unit of investment in public capital
is given by a reduction in current utility via a decrease in consumption −u1(c, n). The beneﬁts,
on the other hand, now depend on the identity of the party that wins the next election. When K ′g
increases, expected future utility rises from the expansion of resources. Type B agents enjoy an
increase of VB1(Kg) =
∂VB(K
′
g)
∂K ′g
utils if they win the next election (which occurs with probability
pB) and WB1(Kg) =
∂WB(K
′
g)
∂K ′g
otherwise (which occurs with probability pA = 1− pB). Given that
the identity of the decision-maker changes over time, the envelope theorem doesn’t hold in this
environment, so the traditional Euler equation will not be satisﬁed. A change in investment today
also modiﬁes the problem faced by voters, which in turn aﬀects the probability of being in power
next period. A rational incumbent realizes this and thus takes into account the eﬀect of expanding
K ′g on its likelihood of winning. It is reasonable to expect that VB(K ′g) > WB(K ′g), a group is better
oﬀ while in power. However, the sign of pB1(K ′g) is, in principle, ambiguous. On the one hand,
we expect that the richer the economy, the lower the political turnover (i.e. the probability of an
incumbent losing the election decreases, so that the same party tends to stay in power longer). This
would imply that by increasing the level of productive capital, the incumbent can tilt the election in
its favor, which creates an extra indirect beneﬁt of having more K ′g. On the other hand, if pB1(K ′g)
was negative, the last term represents an indirect cost to investment inducing the incumbent to
spend resources on non-productive activities instead. Spending on public capital would decrease not
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only current consumption but also future utility via the indirect eﬀect of reducing the probability
of winning the next election.
Politico-economic equilibrium
We can now deﬁne a political equilibrium that takes into account agent’s voting decisions.
Deﬁnition A Markov-perfect equilibrium with endogenous political turnover is a set of value
and policy functions such that:
i. Given the re-election probabilities and CE allocations and prices, the functions hi(Kg),
gBi (Kg), g
A
i (Kg), Vi(Kg), and Wi(Kg) solve incumbent i
′s maximization problem, given by equa-
tions (8), (9), and (10).
ii. Given the re-election probabilities and government policy, the functions ci(Kg) and ni(Kg)
satisfy equations (6) and (7).
iii. Given the optimal rules of the government and CE allocations and prices, pB(Kg) solves
eq. (5) and pA(Kg) = 1− pB(Kg).
The deﬁnition just imposes consistency between private agents and government’s decisions at
every stage (taxation, production, and election).
3.2 Diﬀerentiable Markov Perfect Equilibrium (DMPE)
In order to further characterize the trade-oﬀs faced by an incumbent when choosing investment,
I will focus on diﬀerentiable policy functions. Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2008) made this
assumption (in a diﬀerent context) arguing that there could be in principle an inﬁnitely large
number of Markov equilibria. By assuming diﬀerentiability, the problem delivers a solution that is
the limit to the ﬁnite horizon problem. Moreover, it allows us to derive the government optimality
condition: 12
Proposition 1: Deﬁne
MC = u1 (cB(Kg), nB(Kg)) ,
EMB =
∑
i pi(K
′
g)u1
(
ci(K ′g), ni(K ′g)
) [
F1(K ′g, ni(K ′g)) + 1− δ
]
,
SDE = −pA(K ′g)xg(gA(K ′g))gA1(K ′g)u1
(
cA(K ′g), nA(K ′g)
)
,
IDE = hA1(K ′g)pA(K ′g)[−u1(cA(K ′g), nA(K ′g))+u1(cA(K˜ ′g), nA(K˜ ′g))], where K˜ ′g = h−1B (hA(K ′g)),
SME = pB1(K ′g)[VB(K ′g)−WB(K ′g)] + hA1EB2(ξ′j ;K ′g).
Incumbent B′s ﬁrst order condition can be written as the sum of these terms
MC = β{EMB + SDE + IDE + SME}. (12)
Proof See Appendix 7.1.
12Notice that this expression is not an Euler equation due to the fact that the probabilities depend on the value
functions themselves.
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The left hand side captures the fact that investing in public capital today involves incurring
a marginal cost (MC) in terms of current foregone consumption, while the right hand side of
equation (12) is composed of the discounted sum of four eﬀects of current actions into future
outcomes. Utility is aﬀected directly through the increase in expected marginal beneﬁts and the
spending and investment disagreement eﬀects; and indirectly through the strategic manipulation
eﬀect.
The ﬁrst eﬀect in the optimality condition corresponds to the increase in expected marginal
beneﬁts (EMB) caused by the increase in current public investment. Under no political uncertainty
all other terms are zero, and the EMB coincides with that faced by a benevolent planner, as seen
from equation (3). Because taxes are lump-sum, there are no distortions in the labor supply or
other CE conditions. The eﬀect of increasing K ′g in future investment would only be of second order
and, due to the envelope theorem, there would be no need to keep track of it. The only distortions
in this economy arise due to the presence of political uncertainty (i.e. the fact that pi = 1) and the
existence of group-speciﬁc public goods. Because parties’ constituencies diﬀer, the reaction of the
opposition to a change in K ′g will be sub-optimal from the standpoint of party B (due to the fact
that both groups value the future diﬀerently) introducing a wedge relative to the ﬁrst best.
The second term in the optimality condition, the spending disagreement eﬀect (SDE), captures
the cost of disagreement in terms of public goods provision. When the incumbent is not re-
elected (which happens with probability pA), a marginal increase in public capital today changes
the opposition’s spending in public goods tomorrow by gA1(K ′g). This reports a cost in terms of
foregone consumption next period with no utility beneﬁt since the incumbent derives no utility
from that public good. From today’s perspective it is optimal, then, to decrease investment with
respect to the certainty case: the current incumbent wants to ‘tie the hands’ of its successor in
order to restrict its spending. The disagreement over the composition of public goods together with
the political uncertainty deter investment.13
If parties had the same political power (pA = pB), the composition of expenditures would be
the only source of disagreement. The center of the conﬂict would be what to spend the budget on,
instead of how much to spend (as analyzed in detail in Azzimonti, 2010). All distortions would be
summarized by the SDE. Under asymmetry, there is also disagreement on the levels of spending
and investment, as seen in the two eﬀects described next.
The third term in the optimality condition captures the investment disagreement eﬀect (IDE),
resulting from the fact that parties would invest diﬀerently if in power. To understand the intuition
behind this eﬀect, consider the case were party B is more likely to win an election (pB > pA).
Because the likelihood of staying in power is larger, the expected marginal beneﬁts of investing one
more dollar in public capital are higher than for party A, who would only increase investment next
period by hAk(K ′g). This distorts future investment costs diﬀerentially for both parties introducing
an additional distortion.
Finally, the last eﬀect in eq. (12) is given by the strategic manipulation eﬀect (SME), that
reﬂects the opportunistic behavior of the party in power. The ﬁrst term in the SME incorporates
marginal increases (or decreases) in the probability of winning the election due to increases in
initial resources. Its second term takes into account how changes in today’s public capital alter the
expected value of political shocks.
In order to shed some more light on the characterization of Markov perfect equilibria under
political uncertainty, it is useful to analyze an example economy, where particular functional forms
13This eﬀect is similar to that observed in Persson and Svensson (1989). Besley and Coate (1998) ﬁnd that
disagreements over redistribution policies can result in ineﬃcient levels of investment. Milesi-Ferreti and Spolaore
(1994) also obtain strategic manipulation, but for an alternative environment. For an inﬁnite horizon economy with
symmetric shocks which also exhibits a disagreement eﬀect see Azzimonti (2010).
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are assumed and a closed form solution is derived.
4 An application
Under the following two assumptions regarding technology, preferences, and distribution of ideology
it is possible to ﬁnd an analytical solution. In this section, I characterize it and derive qualitative
implications from the theory. Next, I discuss their validity by looking at empirical evidence.
Assumption 1: Suppose that:
i Technology is Cobb-Douglas F (Kg, n) = AKθgn1−θ with full depreciation, δ = 1.
ii The cost of public goods is linear x(g) = g + G when g > 0 and x(0) = 0.
iii Preferences over consumption are of the GHH form
u(c, n) = log
(
c− n
1+ 1

1 + 
)
where  is the elasticity of labor, and
v(gJ ) = log(gJ + G).
It is instructive to analyze the Pareto optimal allocations ﬁrst, obtained by solving equations
(2) and (3) presented in Section 2.2. Under the assumptions above the economy collapses to a
traditional neoclassical economy, so the standard results apply. There exists a unique equilibrium
where the labor supply takes a simple form,
n(Kg) = [A(1− θ)Kθg ]

1+θ , (13)
and the level of production is given by
F (Kg, n(Kg)) = A¯K θ¯g where A¯ = A[A(1− θ)]
(1−θ)
1+θ and θ¯ =
θ(1 + )
1 + θ
.
Public capital evolves according to
K ′g = s
∗A˜K θ¯g , with A˜ = A¯−
[A(1− θ)] 1+1+θ
1 + 
,
where A˜K θ¯g equals the total amount of resources net of the disutility of labor, and we can think of
it as ‘labor-adjusted’ production. A benevolent planner invests a constant proportion s∗ = βθ¯ of
labor-adjusted resources, independently of the Pareto weights attached to each group (these wights
only aﬀect the composition of region-speciﬁc public goods but not the total amount of resources
devoted to them). Since θ¯ < 1, public capital converges deterministically to a steady state level
K∗g = [βθ¯A˜]
1
1−θ¯ .
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4.1 Dynamic ineﬃciencies in the MPE
In order to characterize the political equilibrium we will make more speciﬁc assumptions regarding
the process that drives ideology shocks.
Assumption 2: Both parties have identical political power μAφA = μBφB ≡ μφ but party B may
have a popularity advantage η ≥ 0.
Recall that ψ represents the popularity of party B relative to party A. When η = 0 both parties
are completely symmetric. If on the other hand η > 0, party B has an average popularity advantage
over party A, creating an asymmetry in their likelihood of retaining power.
The competitive equilibrium given policy determines consumption and labor as functions of
government spending and investment. The labor supply follows eq. (13), due to the fact that taxes
are lump sum and there are no income eﬀects under the GHH formulation. Consumption satisﬁes
ci(Kg) = A¯K θ¯g − gi(Kg)−G− hi(Kg).
Under our functional assumptions, the probabilities of winning an election are independent of
the stock of capital Kg. They are however functions of the marginal propensities to invest, as shown
in Proposition 2, which fully characterizes government policy.
Proposition 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a diﬀerentiable Markov equilibrium
where incumbent i chooses:
gi(Kg) =
1
2
(1− si)A˜K θ¯g −G and hi(Kg) = siA˜K θ¯g ,
and the propensity si satisﬁes
si = θ¯β
[
1 + pi
2− θ¯β (1− pi)
]
. (14)
The probabilities of reelection are pB = 12 + [η − ψ∗(Kg)] and pA = 1− pB, where
ψ∗(Kg) =
3
2
[
ln
(
1− sA
1− sB
)
+
θ¯β
1− θ¯β ln
sA
sB
]
. (15)
Proof See Appendix 7.2.
An incumbent of type i invests a constant proportion of labor-adjusted resources, with the
propensity to invest being a function of the probability of reelection. The next Corollary summarizes
the eﬀect of political uncertainty on government policy.
Corollary 1: The Markov-perfect equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if pi = 1. When
pi < 1 there is under-investment in public capital si < s∗, so the MPE is ineﬃcient.
The intuition behind this result can be understood by looking at the trade-oﬀs faced by the
group in power. An incumbent who believes that he will be replaced with high probability does
not have strong incentives to abstain from consumption today in order to invest in public capital.
Knowing that it is very likely that tomorrow’s policymaker would prefer a diﬀerent composition of
spending, the incumbent tries to manipulate next period’s policy through the choice of the state
variable. He can ‘tie the hands’ of his successor by decreasing the amount of available resources (i.e.
investing a small amount today), which shrinks the tax base in the future. It is then reasonable
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to expect the propensity to invest under political uncertainty to be lower than that chosen by a
planner.
Corollary 2: Stable economies exhibit higher public investment as a fraction of GDP, and
lower expenditures in region-speciﬁc public goods and transfers.
The beneﬁts from an extra unit of investment are not fully internalized, which causes the
incumbent to behave myopically and over-spend today on unproductive public goods (and under-
invest in public capital). The eﬀect is stronger the lower the probability of remaining in power. We
should observe that economies with high political turnover (frequent changes of power) present a
bias towards spending and relatively low levels of investment in infrastructure, education, public
health or other productive activities.
As we can see from Proposition 2, there is also feedback from policy decisions to political
turnover since the probabilities of winning an election are in turn functions of the propensities to
invest. If sB > sA, forward-looking voters realize that candidates from party B spend relatively
more resources in productive activities than the opposition. This increases B′s chances of re-
election. On the other hand, higher investment in public capital implies more taxes and lower
consumption than under party A. This force pushes down the likelihood of B being re-elected.
Overall it is not clear whether pA ≶ pB when sB > sA.
In equilibrium, probabilities of re-elections are jointly determined with propensities to invest.
We have a system of four non-linear equations in four unknowns (pA, pB , sA and sB). From
Proposition 2 it is clear that if η = 0 then the equilibrium is symmetric with sA = sB and
pA = pB = 12 . Proposition 3 establishes that when η > 0 the equilibrium will be asymmetric.
Proposition 3: Let η > 0. Then party B has a popularity advantage, and as a result it invests
more and it is re-elected more often than the opposition
sA < sB < s
∗ and pA < p =
1
2
< pB.
Proof : see Appendix 7.3
When η > 0, party B has an advantage over A because positive realizations of the popularity
shock are more likely. This tilts the utility of all voters in B′s favor, which in turn increases the
probability of winning the next election. From the optimality condition eq. (12), this creates
incentives to invest more. The opposite occurs with party A. Given his low chances of being in
power next period, the incumbent is inclined towards unproductive expenditures. In this example,
we see a virtuous circle: if individuals believe that one party has on average ‘better’ candidates (on
aspects orthogonal to the management of economic policy), the strategic eﬀects imply that they
will indeed behave ‘better’ in choosing policy (overspend less on the unproductive region-speciﬁc
goods). Despite the fact that B’s investment decision is closer than A’s decision to the one that
would be undertaken by a planner, B’s saving propensity is lower than the ﬁrst best, s∗. This is a
result of the short-sightedness created by the political uncertainty and the disagreement over the
composition of expenditures.
This result implies that some caution should be taken when inferring unobservable character-
istics from observable actions in at least two respects. First, because the source of asymmetry is
completely unrelated to how ‘competent’ candidates from diﬀerent parties are. Suppose that we
observe an economy where the average level of output and investment on infrastructure is higher
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under one of the parties, while spending on unproductive activities is lower. It would be incorrect
to infer that candidates belonging to such party are more ‘capable’ or ‘eﬃcient’ in dealing with eco-
nomic issues. This observed outcome could be the result of equilibrium actions consistent with our
model, where even though parties have identical investment technologies, political considerations
make them choose diﬀerent strategies. Second, because preferences over productive and unproduc-
tive spending are completely symmetric here. In the absence of political advantages both parties
would invest equal proportions of available resources while spending the same amount on public
goods. The diﬀerence in policy choices in the asymmetric case is a result of strategic considerations
and does not rely on preference spending biases (i.e. diﬀerences in the weights each group assigns
to public good provision).
Corollary 3: Increases in party B’s popularity advantage η result in higher probability of
winning an election and propensity to invest for this party, while it reduces the opposition’s chances
of gaining power and its incentives to invest in public goods. Formally,
∂pB
∂η
> 0,
∂sB
∂η
> 0,
∂pA
∂η
< 0 and
∂sA
∂η
< 0.
An increase in B′s popularity advantage widens the asymmetry between the two parties. Fore-
seeing an even lower probability of regaining government control, party A chooses to spend a larger
proportion of tax revenues whenever in power.
4.2 Ideology driven business cycles
An interesting feature of this model is that it delivers endogenous cycles in economic variables
generated by parties’ alternation of power. Even though there are no exogenous productivity
shocks, output, investment, consumption, labor, and taxes ﬂuctuate in the long run.
From the government’s maximization problem, the evolution of public capital follows
K ′g = siA˜K
θ¯
g
where si ∈ {sA, sB} depends on the identity of the incumbent. If party i were in power long enough,
capital would approach Kssgi = [siA˜]
1
1−θ¯ . When parties alternate in power, public investment
ﬂuctuates following the political cycle. Since public capital aﬀects the productivity of the private
sector, other macroeconomic variables (such as labor, output, and consumption) also ﬂuctuate,
with political shocks propagating into the real economy. The following corollary summarizes the
evolution of capital.
Corollary 4: Consider an economy with Kg0 < KssgA. Then capital increases at a fast (but not
constant) rate following the political cycle. Eventually, the economy converges to an ergodic set.
Once there, capital ﬂuctuates around a constant mean. Moreover, the economy is ineﬃcient.
If the government were always to follow B’s optimal investment rule, Kg would evolve according
to the upper line in Figure 2, converging eventually to KssgB (where B’s policy function intersects
the 45 degree line). If A’s rule was followed instead, not only would the steady state be lower
(KssgA < K
ss
gB) but convergence would take place at a slower pace. Under political uncertainty the
evolution of capital is stochastic. A possible path is represented by the arrows in Figure 2.
Eventually, the economy reaches an ‘ergodic set’ in which public capital only takes values
belonging to the interval
(
KssgA,K
ss
gA
)
. Once there, all macroeconomic variables evolve cyclically.
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Figure 3 depicts a series of investment for a simulation of this economy (the parameters used
are described in detail in the next section). It also shows the evolution of capital that would be
followed by a benevolent planner. We can see that a planner reaches a signiﬁcantly higher steady
state.
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of investment and spending in region-speciﬁc goods for a period
of time once the economy has reached its ergodic set.
We can see that the economy experiences booms when B is in oﬃce and short periods of recession
when A happens to win an election. For example, consider what happens after t=7, when group
B takes oﬃce. There is an immediate jump in investment and a contraction of expenditures. This
results in larger levels of public capital, and hence more production. Government investment grows
over time (periods 7 to 13) and, as public capital becomes larger, the amount provided of the public
good also increases. Group A gets into power in period 14 and we can see that the expenditures
in public goods has a boost accompanied by a contraction of investment. An empirical implication
from this analysis is that we should observe a jump in unproductive expenditures when a party
that doesn’t win often takes power, together with a sudden decrease in investment. Notice that the
nature of the economic cycle is then intrinsically diﬀerent from the one found in traditional partisan
cycle models, where one of the parties is assumed to derive higher utility from public goods than
the other. It would then be inaccurate to label parties as being ‘right’ or ‘left’ just because they
are observed to choose opposite investment and spending decisions.
Quantitative implications
To shed some more light on the propagation eﬀect of ideology driven cycles I simulate the
economy for a speciﬁc parameterization. A time period represents a year, so the discount factor
is β = 0.95. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988) I assume the elasticity of labor
supply  equal to 2. The level of productivity A is normalized to one. There are three non-standard
parameters in this model: the elasticity of public capital θ, the ﬁxed cost of providing public goods
G, and the popularity advantage η. I choose the three parameters so that simulated moments
at the political equilibrium match three target moments in the data. The ﬁrst target is mean
non-defense public investment investment as a proportion of GDP in the US for the period 1929-
2006 (GNDI/Y ). The second target is average non-defense public consumption as a proportion
to output, for the same time period (GNDC/Y ). All ﬁgures are obtained from the NIPA tables.
The third target is computed so that the equilibrium advantage of party B, given by pB − pA
in the model, matches the average advantage obtained by the Democrats during all congressional
elections to the House of Representatives between 1929 and 2006 (AD). The variable is computed
as follows. Let sht(i) = itDt+Rt denote the share of seats obtained by party i ∈ {R,D} at the
House of Representatives in Congress t ∈ {70nt, ..., 109th} (that is, covering the period 1929-2006).
Following Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004) the advantage of party D at each period of time is
simply Advt = sht(D)− sht(R). I then average out these values over the whole sample period.
I simulated the political equilibrium for 5000 periods and discarded the ﬁrst 1000 to eliminate
the eﬀects of initial conditions. Table I summarizes the value of the parameters obtained from the
calibration, together with the target variables.
The value of θ is in line with empirical estimates and close to the estimate used in Baxter
and King (1993), who set the elasticity of public capital to 0.05. While they use the same target—
public investment as a ratio of output—to calibrate the model, their measure of investment includes
defense expenditures while mine excludes them. If I were to include defense expenditures as well,
I would obtain a value closer to Baxter and King’s. The parameter G captures expenditures that
have not been modeled (such as defense spending). To the extent of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
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time an attempt to estimate the parameter η is done in a calibrated political economy model, so
there is no counterpart in the literature. As we will see in the next section, assuming a constant
value for η is clearly a simpliﬁcation, since its value has ﬂuctuated over the time interval (however,
using a stochastic popularity advantage would complicate the solution presented in this paper, and
it is left for an extension). 14
The size of ﬂuctuations
Table II summarizes the politically induced volatility (ﬁrst row) and cyclicality (second row)
generated by the model for a set of variables of interest, computed from the simulation. The
objective of this exercise is to analyze the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of political shocks. To make this
analysis stark, I am assuming away real business cycles shocks to productivity and only considering
the eﬀect of power changes (hence, a direct comparison of the values obtained with moments from
the data is meaningless).
From the theoretical section of this paper, we know that switches of power cause policy changes
(taxes, spending and investment), which in turn induce ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables.
Public investment is slightly more volatile than public spending in the political equilibrium, as
evident by comparing columns 3 and 4 in Table II. The labor supply is aﬀected directly by changes
in public capital. Output on the other hand, is directly aﬀected by public investment and indirectly
by labor. As a result, output is more volatile than n and Ig. We can also see that both public
spending and public investment are procyclical, with spending being more correlated with output
than investment is. This can be understood by looking back at Figure 4. Whenever the party
enjoying popularity advantage gains power, investment increases. This rises the level of output next
period and increases the amount of resources that can be devoted for public spending. Because this
party stays on average longer in power, y, g, and Ig tend to move in the same direction. Finally,
consumption is highly correlated with output because agents do not have access to capital markets
in this model (ie they cannot save). Analyzing the eﬀect of political shocks on private investment
would be an interesting extension to this paper.
The eﬀect of η
Consider an increase in the value of η in the neighborhood of zero. From Corollary 3 we know
that, everything else constant, the probability of re-election of party B rises. Therefore, if the
incumbent belongs to that group, he is more likely to be succeeded by a candidate of his own type
and has incentives to invest more resources in productive activities. If A was in power instead, a
higher value of η would decrease this party’s probability of staying in power, so the short-sightedness
would be strengthened, resulting in a propensity to invest even further away from the ﬁrst best.
Numerically, we can show that this result extends to all values of η for which B’s probability of
winning an election belongs to the interval [0.5, 1].
Figure (5) illustrates that the relationship between popularity bias and the volatility of the
economic and political variables of interest is non-monotonic.
The reason is that there are two opposing forces driving these volatilities. One is given by the
gap between the propensities to save of each party, which increases the volatility of policy and
allocations. The other force is political stability, which reduces it. When η = 0, both parties are
completely symmetric. Even though political turnover reaches its maximum value (with pA = pB =
0.5), the gap is zero (since sA = sB) so there are no ﬂuctuations in policy or economic variables. As
14See Battaglini (2010) for en environment where a party’s advantage changes over time in a symmetric environment
with commitment.
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η increases, the marginal propensity to invest of type A falls below the symmetric level, while that
of type B lies above that value. Hence, the gap in the marginal propensities to invest is widened
and volatility rises. For small deviations from symmetry, this eﬀect dominates that of political
stability. Eventually, η becomes large enough that even though the gap between sA and sB is large,
political turnover is very infrequent. Since B is in power most of the time, policy remains stable
and volatility goes down.
This result provides a testable implication of the model. Countries where parties are very sym-
metric (ie there is almost no popularity advantage for any of them) will exhibit frequent turnover,
but little volatility in policy variables. We should also expect low variability in countries where
turnover is infrequent. Fluctuations are biggest for those with intermediate values of the ideology
bias.
5 Empirical support
A main point of this paper is that political turnover introduces ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic
variables via changes in policy when one party has a popularity advantage over the opposition.
One implication of the model is that a country should grow faster when the more popular party
is in power. Alesina and Roubini (1997) provide some evidence of this by computing an average
growth rate of output of 4.24% under a Democratic government and of 2.41% under a Republican
one in the US (for the sample 1949-1994). In a standard regression, they found that a change of
regime to a Republican (Democratic) administration, leads to a fall (increase) in output growth
(even after controlling for diﬀerences in the exchange rate system, shocks from the rest of the
world, etc.). The eﬀects of a change in regime also hold for a sample of industrial (and bipartisan)
countries.
Another prediction is that as popularity advantage η goes up, the share of total expenditures
devoted to investment increases (while that of public consumption decreases). The bars in Figure
6 represent the variable Advt (described in detail in the previous section) whose changes proxy
for movements in η, the popularity advantage of the Democratic party over the Republican party
during the period 1929-2006. We can see that Democrats experienced an average advantage since
the series is positive for most of the sample. Because this advantage has not been constant over
time, it is possible to test our prediction by analyzing how changes in popularity aﬀect the share
of public investment.
In order to estimate the investment share as close to the model as possible, I computed it as
the ratio of public investment to government spending,
Investment Share =
GNDI
GNDI +GNDC
,
where GNDI stands for real non-defense public investment and GNDC for real non-defense public
consumption. Both series are obtained from the NIPA tables, and deﬂated by their respective
deﬂator. Notice that I am not using government revenues or total expenditures since the model does
not include debt. The investment share is HP-ﬁltered with w=100 (due to its annual frequency),
and represented by a line in Figure 6. We can see that the popularity advantage and the investment
share are positively related. A correlation coeﬃcient of 0.25 provides support for the theory. 15
15I must note that the value of Advt represents the average number of seats at the end of the t
th Congress. If I
were to correlate the investment share with the popularity advantage at mid-Congress the correlation would decrease
to 0.18.
21
6 Concluding Remarks
I presented a model where disagreements about the composition of spending results in implementa-
tion of myopic policies by the government: investment in infrastructure is too low while spending on
public goods is too high. Groups with conﬂicting interests try to gain power in order to implement
their preferred ﬁscal plan. Since there is a chance of being replaced by the opposition, strategic
manipulation of the level of investment is optimal. In particular, the incumbent invests so as to
restrict spending in the future and to maximize his group’s probability of staying in power. In
contrast to previous models, the degree of ‘impatience’ of the government is endogenous here and
depends on preferences and technology. The forces that drive short-sightedness are disagreement
of consecutive governments, political uncertainty, and the induced lack of commitment.
I considered a case where ideological biases towards candidates from one of the groups gives
them an advantage in the political arena. As a result, the voting equilibrium is asymmetric and
public investment is not only ineﬃciently low but it also ﬂuctuates. The group with the advantage
wins elections more often becoming less impatient, so it chooses a share of investment to GDP closer
to the ﬁrst best. Even though both groups have symmetric preferences over the size of spending and
investment, in equilibrium the group with the disadvantage tends to spend more and invest less.
The political cycle is propagated into the real economy, so as parties alternate in power, diﬀerent
policies are implemented. In equilibrium, macroeconomic variables ﬂuctuate even in the absence of
economic shocks. Moreover, consumption, employment and output are distorted despite the fact
that the government has access to lump-sum taxation.
Increases in the ideological bias induce rises in the share of public investment to total expendi-
tures by the group that has the advantage. I show that this is roughly consistent with evidence from
the US for the period 1929-2006. In a calibrated economy I quantiﬁed the size of the politically in-
duced business cycle and showed that volatility is non-monotonic in the degree of ideological biases.
Economies with intermediate values of this variable are expected to exhibit the largest volatility in
political and economic variables.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The FOC with respect to K ′g is:
u1(cB(Kg), nB(Kg)) = β{pB(K ′g)VB1(K ′g) + pA(K ′g)WB1(K ′g) (16)
+pB1(K ′g)
[
VB(K ′g)−WB(K ′g)
]
+ EB2(ξ′j;K
′
g)},
where pB1(K ′g) =
∂pB(K
′
g)
∂K ′g
. Denote the rule that solves this functional equation by hB(Kg) ≡ KB .
Deﬁne hA(Kg) ≡ KA analogously.
Focus on the problem of party B (and abstract from the subindexes in its value function).
Obtain V1(Kg) by diﬀerentiating equation 9 and simplifying:
V1(Kg) = u1(cB(Kg), nB(Kg))[F1(Kg, nB(Kg)) + 1− δ]. (17)
To ﬁnd W1(Kg) diﬀerentiate equation (10):
W1(Kg) = u1(cA(Kg), nA(Kg))cA1(Kg) + βhA1(Kg) {pB1(KA)[V (KA)−W (KA)]
+pB(KA)V1(KA) + pA(KA)W1(KA) + EA2(ξ′j ;KA)
}
, (18)
where cA1(Kg) = F1(Kg, nA(Kg))+1−δ−xg(gA(Kg))gA1(Kg)−hA1(Kg). Notice that allocations
are evaluated given party A’s policy, because we are considering the value function of a type B
agent when his group is out of power.
Use eq. (16) to solve for W1(hB(Kg)):
W1(KB) =
1
pA(KB)
{
1
β
u1(cB(Kg), nB(Kg))− pB(KB)V1(KB) (19)
−pB1(KB) [V (KB)−W (KB)]− EB2(ξ′j ;KB)
}
.
In order to replace the equation above in eq. (18) we need the value function to be evaluated in
the investment choice of government A, W1(KA). Assuming that the functions hi are invertible,
we can achieve this by evaluating eq. (19) at K˜g = h−1B (hA(Kg)),
W1(KA) =
1
pA(KA)
{
1
β
uc(cB(K˜g), nB(K˜g))− pB(KA)V1(KA) (20)
−pB1(KA) [V (KA)−W (KA)]− EB2(ξ′j;KA)
}
Replace eq. (20) into eq. (18) and simplify:
W1(Kg) = u1(cA(Kg), nA(Kg))[F1(Kg, nA(Kg)) + 1− δ − xg(gA(Kg))gA1(Kg)] (21)
−hA1(Kg)[u1(cA(Kg), nA(Kg))− uc(cB(K˜g)), nB(K˜g))].
Update eq.(21) by substituting Kg with K ′g = hB(Kg) and replace in eq.(16). After some
manipulations obtain
u1(cB(Kg), nB(Kg)) = β
⎧⎨
⎩ ∑
i=A,B
pi(K ′g)u1(ci(K
′
g), ni(K
′
g))[F1(K
′
g, ni(K
′
g)) + 1− δ] (22)
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−pA(K ′g)xg(gA(K ′g))gA1(K ′g)u1(cA(K ′g), nA(K ′g))
−hA1(K ′g)pA(K ′g)[u1(cA(K ′g), nA(K ′g))− uc(cB(K˜g
′
)), nB(K˜g
′
))]
+pB1(K ′g)
[
V (K ′g)−W (K ′g)
]
+ EB2(ξ′j ;K
′
g)
}
.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Guess a constant probability pi(Kg) = pi and a constant investment share hi(Kg) = siA˜K θ¯g . Eq.
(11) implies:
gB(Kg) = cˆB(Kg) =
1
2
(1− sB)A˜K θ¯g ,
with cˆB(Kg) = cB(Kg)− nB(Kg)
1+
1+ . Equation (12) simpliﬁes to reduces to:
1
cˆB(Kg)
= β
{
pB
fK(K ′g)
cˆB(K ′g)
+ (1− pB)
[fK(K ′g)− gBK(Kg)]
cˆA(K ′g)
+
(1− pB)hAK(K ′g)
[
− 1
cˆA(K ′g)
+
1
c˜B(K ′g)
]}
.
where K ′g = hB(Kg) = sBA˜K θ¯g and c˜B(K ′g) =
1
2
1−sB
sB
sAA˜K
′θ¯
g .
Replacing the guess into the equation above and simplifying,
sB =
βθ¯(1 + p¯B)
2− βθ¯(1 + p¯B)
. (23)
This veriﬁes that if pi constant ⇒ si constant.
To verify that pi is constant, note that the value functions satisfy
Vj(Kg) = ν¯j + νj ln(Kg). (24)
Wj(Kg) = ω¯j + ωj ln(Kg), (25)
where
νj =
θ¯(2− θ¯βpi)
1− θ¯β and ωj =
θ¯(1 + θ¯βpj)
1− θ¯β ,
ν¯j =
1
1− β
{
β(1− pj)
[
ln
(
1
2
(1− si)A˜
)
+ β[pjνj + (1− pj)ωj] ln(siA˜)
+[1− β(1− pj)]
[
2 ln
(
1
2
(1− sj)A˜
)
+ β[pjνj + (1− pj)ωj ] ln(sjA˜)
]}
,
ω¯j =
1
1− β(1− pj)
{
ln
(
1
2
(1− si)A˜
)
+ β
[
pj ν¯j + [pjνj + (1− pj)ωj ] ln(siA˜)
]}
.
Replace eq.(24) and eq.(25) into eq.(4) to obtain the expression that determines ψ∗(Kg).
Finally, we verify that probabilities are constant and that governments choose to invest a pro-
portion of output. Notice that these rules are increasing in capital, diﬀerentiable and invertible.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The Proof will be done in two steps.
Step 1: Let η = 0. Then, there exists a symmetric solution.
Substitute eq. (14) into eq. (15), and evaluate at pA(Kg) = 12 − η + ψ∗(K ′g) to obtain
pA =
1
2
− η + 3
2
{
ln
(
2− θ¯βpA
2− θ¯β(1− pA)
)
+
θ¯β
1− βθ¯ ln
(
1 + pA
2− θ¯β(1− pA)
2− θ¯βpA
2− pA
)}
. (26)
At η = 0, pA = 12 solves equation (26). Replace this into eq. (14) to obtain sA = sB.
Step 2: Let η > 0. Then, there exists an asymmetric solution
The LHS of equation (26) is increasing in pA. The RHS is also increasing in pA for any pA ∈ [0, 1]
since
∂RHS(pA)
∂pA
=
3
2
θ¯β
(
pA
(2− θ¯βpA)(2 − pA)
+
1− pA
(2− θ¯β(1− pA))(1 + pA)
)
> 0.
From Step 1, there exists a solution at η = 0. Now let η > 0. The LHS remains unchanged and
the RHS shifts to the left. Hence pA < 12 and pB >
1
2 . Replace these in eq. (14) for i = {A,B} to
see that sA < sB.
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8 Tables and Figures
Variable Parameter Target Target Value
Elasticity of public investment θ = 0.039 Public Investment/Output GNDI/Y = 2.88
Fixed cost of public goods G = 0.063 Public Spending/Output GNDC/Y = 13.84
Popularity advantage η = 0.068 Democrat advantage AD = 0.145
Table I: Calibration targets.
Moment Y c Ig g n
St. Dev 1.15 0.94 0.30 0.24 0.89
Corr (Y,x) 1.00 0.98 0.13 0.78 1.00
Table II: Political cycle moments
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Figure 1: Utility as a function of ϕjA′
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